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Abstract 
Using net replacement rates between net household income while out of work and in 
work, we investigate to what extent taxes and benefits may affect work incentives. We find 
that in 2006, net replacement rates are higher for low-income households and for house-
holds with children and a partner, attenuating work incentives. Work incentives are signifi-
cantly affected by eligibility rules and the amounts of benefits, particularly unemployment 
benefit and social assistance. Next, we examine how the reform of social benefits intro-
duced in 2007 affects work incentives. While social assistance is less generous, diminish-
ing the incidence of high net replacement rates, the reform gives preferential treatment to 
households with some work income. Net replacement rates are also higher for households 
with children, who receive a substantially higher housing benefit, but some less well-off 
households consequently receive less social assistance. We also see that increased 
parental allowance has the same crowding-out effect on other income-tested benefits   
as higher housing benefit has on social assistance. In addition, the rise in parental 
allowance may lock eligible individuals in non-employment, increasing the loss of human 
capital. This is particularly important for lone parents, who face the highest specific 
unemployment rate compared to other household types.  
1. Introduction 
Labor market institutions, particularly welfare benefits, have been identified 
as contributing to unemployment dynamics in market economies. For example, Nickell, 
Nunziata, and Ochel (2005) find that more than half of the rise in Western European 
unemployment from the 1960s to the first half of the 1990s is explained by changes 
in institutions, particularly welfare benefits, labor taxes, unions, and employment 
protection.
1  
The importance of financial disincentives for employed and unemployed 
workers is analyzed, for example, in Pedersen and Smith (2002). Based on a panel 
survey merged with administrative registers, they measure the financial incentives for 
Danish labor participants between employment and being on unemployment benefits, 
while they also account for fixed costs of work such as commuting and child care 
costs. The results show that in 1996, 6% of men and 13% of women had effective 
replacement rates higher than 100%, which they associate with substantial work dis-
incentives. While they also include several attitude measures into the regressions, 
* This work was supported by Czech National Bank Research Project No. D2/05. We thank Martin Guzi 
from CERGE-EI for calculating aggregate data from the Labor Force Survey and Petr Král, Andrew
Shephard, Jiří Večerník, and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. We are responsible for all
errors and omissions. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those
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1  Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) argue on the other hand that the rise in unemployment is explained not by
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the main conclusion is that financial measures have the strongest influence on the risk 
of being trapped in unemployment. A negative impact of taxation on the labor market in 
developed economies is also indentified in Buti, Sestio, and Wijkander (2001). They 
conclude that in the past 20 years the importance of labor taxation has increased, lead-
ing to crowding out of labor for capital, particularly for low-skilled employees.  
The evidence on the role of institutions in explaining unemployment paths is 
less straightforward for countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Boeri and 
Terrell (2002) find that relatively generous non-employment benefits in CEE econo-
mies established a wage floor in the 1990s that increased the pace of restructuring by 
shedding less productive labor. Their evidence, however, does not say whether welfare 
benefits are responsible for high unemployment rates. Focusing on the role of welfare 
benefits, Jurajda and Münich (2002) explore the mechanism of the rise in long-term 
unemployment in the economies of CEE using the case of the Czech Republic. They 
provide evidence on the importance of observable worker characteristics in driving 
Czech long-term unemployment and find a significant effect of welfare generosity on 
families with more than three children and low-educated parents. On the other hand, 
Commander and Heitmueller (2007) find little evidence that institutions, primarily 
unemployment benefits, can explain differences in unemployment rates or flows in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. They use OECD net replacement rates  
for specific family types and merge the rates with the individual level Labor Force 
Survey data, controlling for the number of children, marital status, and the length of 
unemployment.
2  
While the Czech tax system is comprehensively described, for example, in 
Bronchi and Burns (2000), there is only scant evidence on the interactions between 
taxes and benefits. Průša (2001) describes the social security system and displays dis-
tributions of households receiving particular benefits. His evidence is based on data 
from the Ministry of Labor. Using income surveys (Mikrocenzus), Večerník (2002, 
2006) analyzes the joint effect of taxes and benefits on the distribution of household 
income. Based on household budget survey data, Schneider and Jelínek (2001) and 
Schneider (2004) examine in more detail the effects of the Czech social security 
system on household income distribution. Although some of these studies rely on 
individual-level data, their results concern aggregate measures. Jurajda and Zubricky 
(2005) calculate net replacement rates and marginal effective tax rates for a wide 
range of family types and earnings levels and assess how they affect work incentives. 
Hrdlicka et al. (2010) analyze the impact of the personal income tax reform introduced 
in 2008, focusing on changes in effective tax rates between 2006 and 2008. Their 
analysis thus captures changes in work incentives caused by the 2008 tax reform in 
interaction with changes in social benefits implemented in 2007. 
The Czech labor market provides a unique opportunity to investigate the effect  
of welfare benefits on labor market dynamics. The unemployment rate was extra-
ordinarily low in international comparison until the  mid-1990s, but has increased 
since then (from 4.0% in 1995 to 7.3% in 2002).
3 The tax-benefit system may have 
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Figure 1  Unemployment Rate by Household Types (%) 
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contributed to the rise in unemployment. In particular, providing relatively high wel-
fare income increases the  reservation wages of the  unemployed, attenuating job 
search incentives. Furthermore, if welfare benefits affect labor market dynamics, 
decreasing the package of welfare benefits would alleviate high unemployment. 
To illustrate the effect of household composition on labor market performance, 
Figure 1 shows specific unemployment rates for selected household types.
4 Six house-
hold types are defined, namely, without or with children, and also without a partner 
or with a partner (a second adult household member), either non-working or working. 
The results suggest that the unemployment rate increased for all household types at 
the end of the 1990s, particularly for single adults living with children (lone parents). 
On the other hand, the unemployment rate is the lowest for persons from households 
with a working partner, either with or without children; it increased by only about  
3 or 4 percentage points between 1996 and 2000. 
These results indicate that household composition, and particularly the presence 
of another adult person in the household and her or his labor supply, significantly 
affects the unemployment rate.
5 This suggests that labor supply is often a joint deci-
sion within couples. On the other hand, less labor market experience and low attach-
ment to the labor market may to some extent explain the high unemployment rate of 
lone parents. These are important factors to incorporate into the analysis of the link 
between net replacement rates and labor market dynamics.  
In this paper we ask to what extent Czech taxes and benefits may affect 
employment and unemployment. We derive tax-benefit equations for 2006 and, using 
these equations, we analyze for specific household types’ net replacement rates between 
the net household income when a person stays at home and the net household income 
when the person works, assuming that the income of other household members, if 
3 The unemployment rate increased after the mid-1990s due to a recession. This was associated with con-
siderable changes in labor market flows. In particular, the inflow rate into unemployment almost doubled
in the second half of the 1990s, while the outflow rate from unemployment decreased in that period, 
increasing the incidence of long-term unemployment (Galuščák and Münich, 2007). 
4 The specific unemployment rates comply with the ILO definition, i.e., an unemployed individual does not 
have a job, is actively seeking a job, and is ready to start working within two weeks. 
5 Sorm and Terrell (2000) explore demographic factors of labor market flows in 1994–1998 using
the Czech LFS. They find that married people are more likely to be employed than single people. 30                                      Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 62, 2012, no. 1 
any, is unchanged. We associate high net replacement rates with work disincentives.
6 
We focus on the pecuniary motivation for job search, but other factors, such as job 
search monitoring by the authorities providing social benefits, are also important. We 
investigate which instruments particularly affect net household income, increasing 
net replacement rates. We analyze major changes to benefits introduced in 2007 and 
their effect on work incentives. In the paper we concentrate on the pure effects of 
the  combination of taxes and benefits on labor market behavior, and neglect, for 
example, redistributive effects or the incidence of poverty rates.
7 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the system of taxes and 
benefits in the Czech Republic in 2006 and the main changes introduced in 2007. We 
focus on those taxes and benefits which we use in the microsimulations. Section 3 
describes the microsimulations. In Section 4 we discuss the results, while Section 5 
concludes. Figures showing the main results are provided in the Appendix. 
2. Taxes and Benefits 
In this section we describe the Czech tax-benefit system in 2006 and the main 
changes introduced in 2007. The tax-benefit system in general consists of taxes and 
social and health insurance contributions and social benefits. Taxes and benefits are 
administered at the central level, with the exception of social assistance benefits, which 
are provided at the municipal level. We focus our description on benefits, which we 
use in the microsimulations, and on personal income tax and social and health 
insurance contributions paid by employees.
8  
Personal income tax
9 is paid by a person who has residence or lives in the Czech 
Republic for at least 183 days in a year. The tax base includes wages and salaries, 
income from business activities, capital income, rental income, and other income. 
Some types of income, such as income of authors of less than CZK 3,000 per month 
and dividends, are taxed at separate tax rates. The tax base does not include sickness 
benefits, state social support, social assistance, unemployment benefit, the amount of 
pensions lower than CZK 162,000 per year, stipends, tax bonuses, etc. 
The income tax is paid from the tax base minus social and health insurance 
contributions and other tax deductible items such as gifts to charitable organizations 
and interest used for mortgage repayments. Married couples with at least one child 
all living in the same household could choose in 2006 to fill out a joint tax return. 
Four marginal tax rates were applied in 2006: 12%, 19%, 25%, and 32%. Taxpayers 
could deduct the following amounts from their income tax: personal allowance for 
each taxpayer, spouse allowance, disability allowance, student allowance, and allow-
ance per child. 
Social and health insurance contributions consist of social insurance (further 
divided into pension insurance, contributions for the state employment policy, and 
6 We do not associate work disincentives with a specific threshold in the net replacement rate. 
7 We assume that the demand side of the labor market does not constrain work incentives. We also do not
consider fixed costs of work related, for example, to commuting and child care. These costs would in
principle lead to higher net replacement rates. 
8 See Galuščák and Pavel (2007) for a detailed description of the Czech tax and benefit system. Taxes and 
benefits are also described in Hrdlicka et al. (2010). 
9 Income tax is paid by corporations and individuals. Since the microsimulation model is household-
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sickness insurance) and health insurance contributions. The  contributory base is 
the gross wage plus any bonuses, but not income which is not subject to income 
taxation, occasional income, income taxed under a separate tax scheme, etc.
10  
Social benefits include social insurance benefits (unemployment benefits, sick-
ness benefits, pensions), state social support (child benefit, social supplement, housing 
benefit, parental allowance, foster care benefit, birth grant, funeral grant), and social 
assistance (social assistance benefit, social care benefit). The system is organized 
around the minimum living standard (MLS), which is calculated at the personal and 
household level, and is intended to reflect the cost of living. Most types of benefits 
are then defined as given percentages of the overall family level MLS. 
Unemployment benefit (podpora v nezaměstnanosti) is available to individuals 
actively searching for a job who were employed for at least 12 months in the pre-
vious three years and who are not receiving an old-age pension, full invalidity pen- 
sion or sickness benefits. The benefit is non-taxable and is calculated from income net 
of social insurance contributions and income tax in the previous job. The amount of 
the benefit is 50% of the previous income in the first three months and 45% in 
the following three months of the unemployment spell, but not more than 2.5 times 
the MLS of an adult one-member household (i.e. at most CZK 11,050 per month in 
2006). Furthermore, the benefit is paid for longer than six months for persons older 
than 50. 
All benefits provided through state social support are non-taxable and may be 
divided between income-tested and non-income-tested benefits. Net household 
income for the purposes of income tests for state social support is defined as income 
net of income tax and contributions, sickness benefits, unemployment benefits, pen-
sions, etc. The tax bonus per child is not included. A family is defined for the purposes 
of state social support (except housing benefit, for which all persons with the same 
domicile address are considered) as a person, dependent children, parents of dependent 
children, spouses or partners, and dependent children of dependent children (if they 
are not married, widowed or divorced) if they live with the person in the same house-
hold and meet the costs of living together.
11  
Child benefit (přídavek na dítě) is targeted at families with children if their net 
household income in the previous calendar year is less than 3 MLS ×  of the family. 
The net household income which is tested for the purposes of child benefit is the net 
household income (defined above) plus foster care benefit and parental allowance 
(defined below). A social supplement (sociální příplatek) is available to families with at 
least one dependent child if their net income was less than 1.6 MLS ×  in the previous 
quarter. Net household income for the purposes of the income test is the net house-
hold income relevant for the child benefit test plus child benefit. Housing benefit 
(příspěvek na bydlení) is available to families who own or rent a flat and whose  
net income was below 1.6 MLS × in the previous quarter. A household or a family 
is defined as all persons residing at the same domicile address. The household may 
thus contain, for example, non-relative persons such as tenants. Housing benefit is 
received by the household head. Due to common practice, however, we assume for 
10 Employees pay 8.0% of their gross income in social insurance and 4.5% in health insurance. 
11 The definition of a family for the purposes of state social support and social assistance includes spouses
or partners. Within personal income tax, spouse allowance may be applied for one’s own spouse only. 32                                      Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 62, 2012, no. 1 
the purposes of the microsimulations that a household is defined in the same way as 
for state social support and for social assistance. Net household income for the pur-
poses of the income test for housing benefit is the same as for the social supplement. 
Parental allowance (rodičovský příspěvek) is a non-tested benefit available to a parent 
who cares in person and on a daily basis for a child up to four years old, or up to 
seven years old when the child is disabled. The amount of the parental allowance is 
1.54 MLS ×  of an adult person (CZK 3,696 in 2006).
12  
Social assistance includes social assistance benefits and social care benefits. 
Social assistance benefit (dávka sociální potřebnosti) serves as a last resort. When 
the net household income, including any state social support benefits, is less than 
the family-level MLS, the household is entitled to social assistance benefit that tops 
up the net household income to the household level MLS. Net household income is 
defined as the average monthly income, net of income tax and contributions, plus 
unemployment benefit, sickness benefit, pensions, and state social support. The tax 
bonus is not considered. Social assistance benefit may be increased to account for 
the cost of housing or costs related to health, etc. Conversely, it can be lowered if 
the person is not actively searching for a job or active in improving his or her own 
financial situation, etc. Social care benefit (dávka sociální péče) is a one-off specific 
allowance usually paid to disabled people for specific purposes. 
In 2007, taxes and social and health contributions were not changed, but major 
changes to some benefits were implemented. The main pillar of the reform in 2007 
was the changeover to a one-component construction of the minimum living standard 
level and the introduction of an existence minimum. Consequently, the income test 
rules were adjusted for child benefit and the social supplement. Major changes to 
parental allowance, housing benefit, and social assistance were introduced. The con-
cept of the minimum living standard was changed to reflect the number of persons  
in the household only. In particular, household level MLS amounts are no longer 
defined, while the  personal amounts account for the  second and further adults in 
the household at a reduced rate. In addition to the new MLS concept, a so-called 
“existence minimum” of CZK 2,020 a month was introduced as the minimum amount 
necessary to survive. It replaces the MLS in the formula for social assistance benefits 
if an unemployed person does not cooperate to improve his situation (refuses job 
offers etc.). The existence minimum is not applied to dependent children or persons 
receiving full invalidity or old-age pension or older than 65. 
The maximum amount of unemployment benefit was increased to 58% of 
the economy-wide average wage in the first three quarters of the preceding year, i.e. 
CZK 11,722, while it was CZK 11,050 in 2006. The formulas for child benefit and 
the social supplement were adjusted to reflect the changes in the MLS.
13 The amount 
of parental allowance increased substantially to 40% of the average wage in 
the non-profit sector two years before. In 2007 it was equal to CZK 7,582, while it 
was CZK 3,696 in 2006. 
The construction of  housing benefit was changed to account for housing 
costs. The household is entitled to this benefit if its housing costs are higher than 
12 Other non-tested benefits include foster care benefit (dávka pěstounské péče), birth grants (porodné), and 
funeral grants (pohřebné). 
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30% (35% in Prague) of the  net household income, while the  housing costs are   
at most normative costs. The normative costs are declared by the Ministry of Labor  
and Social Affairs, reflecting the number of persons in the household, the number  
of inhabitants in the municipality, and the type of housing (rental and other). 
The amount of the housing benefit is equal to the difference between the normative 
costs and 30% (35% in Prague) of the net household income. If the net household 
income is lower than the MLS, the household is entitled to the benefit if its housing 
costs are higher than 30% (35% in Prague) of the MLS. The amount of the benefit is 
30% (35% in Prague) of the MLS.  
Within social assistance benefit, the net household income relevant for the in-
come test reflects 70% of work and other income and 80% of unemployment benefits 
and sickness benefits. Within social assistance, a new benefit (housing supplement) 
is provided. It is targeted at households whose net household income, including hous-
ing benefit and social assistance benefit and after paying housing costs (at most 
the normative costs), is still lower than the MLS. Their income is then topped up to 
the MLS on the assumption that the individual actively seeks a job. Due to common 
practice, we assume that all individuals eligible for social assistance benefits meet 
the requirement of active job search. 
3. Microsimulations 
Using the information provided in the previous section, we write tax-benefit 
equations. For appropriate parameters from 2006 and 2007, the equations allow us to 
calculate personal income tax for any individual with taxable income, considering tax 
allowances, and social and health insurance contributions. Using the assumption on 
household composition, we determine the benefits for which the household is eligible 
and the resulting net household income. We simulate the following benefits: unemploy-
ment benefit, child benefit, social supplement, housing benefit, parental allowance,
14  
and social assistance benefit.
15  
We define three household types without children and three household types 
with two children aged 6 and 4: a single adult, a one-earner couple (with a non-working 
partner), and two-earner couple (with a partner earning half of the full economy-wide 
average wage).
16 In order to investigate the effect of increased parental allowance in 
2007, which is provided for caring for children younger than 4, we consider a further 
three household types with two children aged 4 and 2 as an alternative. 
Applying the tax-benefit equations to these prototypal households, we calcu-
late net replacement rates (NRR) as 







where yout is net household income when the household member is out of work and 
14 Child benefit, social supplement, housing benefit, and parental allowance represent major benefits provided
through state social support. In 2006, 32% of the costs for state social support were for child benefit, 13%
for social supplement, 7% for housing benefit, and 40% for parental allowance. 
15 In 2007, housing supplement was a part of social assistance. 
16 Our choice represents the main household types. The same household types are used by OECD. See 
OECD (2007) and also Immervoll et al. (2004) for a discussion of the representativeness of these house-
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yin  is net household income when the  household member works, assuming that 
the gross income of the other adult partner in the household, if there is any, remains 
the same.
17  
We consider two out of work labor market states in yout. The short-term unem-
ployed are those receiving unemployment benefits (which expire after 6 months), 
while the  long-term unemployed are defined as persons without unemployment 
benefits. We assume a  household living in a  small town in simulating housing 
benefit. Regarding social assistance, we assume that all the unemployed are actively 
seeking a job, so that when a household is eligible, social assistance benefits top up 
the net household income to the MLS amount.  
The microsimulations do not capture income from the informal economy. In 
particular, income from unofficial work is not included in net household income, 
which is tested for the purposes of benefit eligibility. Households have incentives  
to declare low net household income in order to be eligible for social benefits. On 
the other hand, income from informal work leads to higher net replacement rates.
18 
The non-take-up of benefits is another effect which is not captured by our micro-
simulations. It reduces net replacement rates, thus increasing work incentives. Mareš 
(2001) shows that the non-take-up is in general less widespread than in other EU 
countries. Hence, we believe that our results are little affected by neglecting the non-
take-up of benefits. 
4. Results 
We investigate net replacement rates for particular household types in 2006 in 
the case of transitions between employment and short-term unemployment (Figure A1), 
and between employment and long-term unemployment (Figure A2). We also de-
compose the net replacement rates into the contributions of net work income and 
particular benefits. 
In general, net replacement rates are higher for low wage earners, as indicated 
in left-hand part of the NRR profiles, while they are also higher when children or 
a partner are present in the household. Regarding transitions into short-term unem-
ployment (Figure A1), the amount of unemployment benefit significantly affects net 
replacement rates for all the household types. Social assistance is the main factor 
increasing the NRR for low wage earners among single individuals and households 
with a non-working partner, while the contributions of housing benefit and for house-
holds with children of child benefit and social supplement are lower.  
17  Net replacement rates show how net household income drops when a  household member becomes 
unemployed. NRRs thus indicate the degree of generosity of benefits while out of work. In fact, the drop 
in net household income is less pronounced for two-earner couples. A more relevant indicator of financial 
incentives to work may be the average effective tax rate, which relates the change in net household income 
to the change in gross earnings of a household member and is thus not directly affected by income earned
by other household members. See OECD (2007) for definitions of work incentives indicators. In this
paper, we use net replacement rates as an indicator of work incentives. 
18 Jurajda and Zubricky (2005) show that income from unofficial work significantly reduces the job-seeking
incentives for unemployed persons. In particular, when taking up an official job, net replacement rates may 
be greater than 100%, since entering into the official employment figures results not only in the loss of some
social support, but also in the loss of any income from unofficial work. Evidence on high disincentives to
job-seeking of persons with income from unofficial work can also be found in Jahoda (2004). Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 62, 2012, no. 1                                                35 
For transitions between employment and long-term unemployment, where 
unemployment benefit is not provided, net replacement rates are driven primarily by 
social assistance in the case of single individuals and households with a non-working 
partner, or by the work income of the other partner, if there is any (Figure A2). For 
all household types, other benefits contribute to the net replacement rates, particu-
larly for low wage earners. 
Net replacement rates capture relative changes in net household income in 
the state without and with employment. In order to examine how the reform in 2007 
affects net household income in both employment and unemployment, we investigate 
the contributions of taxes and social benefits to net household income in 2007 
relative to 2006 in Figures A3 to A5. While the left-hand panels show the changes in 
contributions to net household income in CZK for employed individuals, the middle 
panels concern the short-term unemployed with unemployment benefits, and the right-
hand panels are for the long-term unemployed, who are not eligible for unemploy-
ment benefits.
19 
Among households without children (Figure A3), employed low wage earners 
living alone or with a non-working partner see a mild increase in their net household 
income due to higher housing benefit and social assistance, except for the lowest 
wages, where the social assistance is reduced. Social assistance benefits are affected 
by two factors in 2007. While the lower MLS in 2007 leads to a lower amount of 
social assistance benefits, the benefits are conversely increased by the introduction  
of reduction coefficients into the eligibility test for social assistance in 2007 (see 
Section 2). This favors households with work income, as more households with some 
work income are eligible for social assistance benefit in 2007. The increase in net 
income is hence about CZK 1,600 per month for individuals earning about 40% of 
the  average wage from households with a  non-working partner (left-hand middle 
panel in Figure A3).
20 The peak moves to 80% of the potential entry wage for the short-
term unemployed from the same household category (middle panel in Figure A3).  
On the other hand, the short-term unemployed with a high entry wage benefit from 
the rise in the maximum amount of unemployment benefit in 2007 (see all middle 
panels in Figure A3). Finally, long-term unemployed persons living alone or with a non-
working partner are worse off in 2007 than in 2006 (right-hand panels in Figure A3). 
While the housing benefit is higher, the reduction in social assistance due to the lower 
MLS leads to lower net household income in 2007 than in 2006 for households 
without a partner or with a non-working partner. On the other hand, the long-term 
unemployed from households with working partners (earning half of the  average 
wage) see higher net household income in 2007 due to higher social assistance (right-
hand bottom panel in Figure A3). This category benefits from the introduction of 
reduction coefficients into the income test for social assistance in 2007, leading to 
higher social assistance benefits for households with a working partner relative to 
households where the partner has no work income.  
19 In Figures A3 to A5 the left-hand part is the change in 2007 relative to 2006 in yin in (1), the middle part 
is the  change in yout for the  short-term unemployed, and the  right-hand part is the  change in yout for 
the long-term unemployed. 
20 Total net household income per period is used in income tests for social benefits. However, most
workers work full-time in the Czech Republic, suggesting that the incidence of very low-wage earners is 
low, as the ratio of the full-time minimum to average wage was 38% in 2006. 36                                      Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 62, 2012, no. 1 
The reform of benefits introduced in 2007 brought significant changes to 
the net income of households with children, as documented in Figures A4 and A5. 
While the overall patterns are similar to those of households without children, house-
holds with children receive substantially higher housing benefit and also a higher 
social supplement, while for low wage earners and the long-term unemployed (single 
or with a non-working partner) the social assistance benefit is reduced. In particular, 
employed individuals either without or with a partner who does not work have a higher 
net household income if they earn up to 100% or 120% of the average wage (left-
hand panels in Figure A4). On the other hand, all household types with short-term 
unemployed individuals (middle part in Figure A4) receive more in 2007 due to higher 
housing benefit, except for very low potential entry wages, where social assistance is 
reduced. Furthermore, the long-term unemployed are worse off in 2007 if there is no 
partner in the  household, or have about the  same net income if they have a  non-
working partner (right-hand upper and middle panels in Figure A4). They do not 
benefit from the increased housing benefit, because of a significant drop in social 
assistance due to the lower MLS in 2007. On the contrary, long-term unemployed 
individuals face higher net household income if there is a working partner in the house-
hold (right-hand bottom panel in Figure A4). Again, the reduction coefficients 
implemented in the eligibility test for social assistance benefits do not penalize house-
holds with work income as compared to households where no one works. Households 
with children also see a higher social supplement in 2007, while various positive and 
negative peaks in net household income are observed due to shifts in the eligibility 
criteria for child benefits. 
The contributions of taxes and benefits to net household income are simulated 
in Figure A4 for households with two children aged 6 and 4. In order to examine how 
the significant rise in the amount of parental allowance in 2007 affects the results, 
Figure A5 shows the net household income change for households with two children 
aged 4 and 2 that are eligible for parental allowance. As parental allowance is not 
income-tested, all household types benefit from the increased parental allowance 
regardless of the labor market status of the person in question. However, households, 
particularly those with low wage earners or long-term unemployed individuals, face 
reductions in other benefits, so that the total change in net household income is lower 
than the amount of the increased parental allowance. The conclusion from this com-
parison is that while the parental allowance is higher for all, some less well off 
households lose by reductions in other income-tested benefits. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we ask to what extent Czech taxes and benefits may affect work 
incentives. We investigate net replacement rates between net household income in 
the states without and with work income of a household member and associate high 
levels of these rates with work disincentives. We first show that unemployment is 
related to household composition, particularly to the presence of a partner and her or 
his labor supply and also to children in the household. In particular, the specific 
unemployment rate is the highest for lone parents with children, while it is low for 
individuals from households with a working partner. This suggests that labor supply 
is often a joint decision within couples and that work habits due to household compo-Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 62, 2012, no. 1                                                37 
sition and labor market attachment affect labor market behavior. Hence, we simulate 
net replacement rates by household types. 
We show that net replacement rates are higher in 2006 for low-income house-
holds and households with children or a partner. While unemployment benefit affects 
net replacement rates for the short-term unemployed, social assistance significantly 
affects the  net replacement rates of households comprising low-wage single indi-
viduals and households with a non-working partner. Social assistance also largely 
determines the  net replacement rates of households with long-term unemployed 
individuals living without a partner or with a non-working partner. Eligibility rules 
and the amounts of benefits, particularly unemployment benefit and social assistance, 
are thus important, as they may affect work incentives. 
We also provide evidence on how the reform of social benefits introduced in 
2007 impacts on work incentives through changes in net household income. We find 
that long-term unemployed persons living alone or with a non-working partner are 
worse off in 2007 than in 2006. They receive a higher housing benefit in 2007, but 
social assistance benefits are reduced, so that their net household income is lower  
in 2007 than in 2006. On the other hand, long-term unemployed individuals from 
households with a working partner benefit from the introduction of reduction coef-
ficients into the eligibility rule for social assistance. While social assistance is in 
general less generous, diminishing the incidence of high net replacement rates for 
low wage earners from households with a non-working partner, the reform gives pref-
erential treatment to households with some work income by increasing the  amount   
of social assistance benefits 
The reform in 2007 led to significant changes in the net income of households 
with children. The effect of the reform is in general the same as in households with-
out children, but households with children receive substantially higher housing 
benefit. On the other hand, lower social assistance for households without a partner 
or with a non-working partner decreases their net household income. We also show 
that households with small children greatly benefit from a higher parental allowance 
in 2007, but some less well-off households (with low wage earners or long-term 
unemployed individuals) see a reduction in other income-tested benefits. Increased 
parental allowance thus has the  same crowding-out effect on other income-tested 
benefits as higher housing benefit has on social assistance. In addition, the higher 
parental allowance may lead to a loss of human capital among parents by locking 
them in non-employment. This is particularly important for lone parents, who face 




Figure A1  Contribution of Benefits to NRRs in 2006:  
Transitions Into Short-Term Unemployment  
(Left: no children, right: two children aged 6 and 4) 
no partner
non-working partner
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Notes: Transitions between employment and short-term unemployment; the wage in the relation to the economy-
wide average wage in % is on the horizontal axis. Contribution of work income (work), unemployment 
benefit (UB), child benefit (CB), social supplement (SS), housing benefit (HB) and social assistance 
(SA). The ratio of the minimum to average wage was 38% in 2006. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 62, 2012, no. 1                                                39 
Figure A2  Contribution of Benefits to NRRs in 2006:  
Transitions Into Long-Term Unemployment  
(Left: no children, right: two children aged 6 and 4) 
no partner
non-working partner
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Notes: Transitions between employment and long-term unemployment; the wage in the relation to the economy-
wide average wage in % is on the horizontal axis. Contribution of work income (work), child benefit 
(CB), social supplement (SS), housing benefit (HB) and social assistance (SA). The ratio of the mini-
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